A fivefold increase in central bank foreign reserves across the globe over the past fifteen years has prompted questions whether it constitutes a new form of mercantilism. According to this view, countries accumulate foreign reserves in order to support export promotion by influencing exchange rates and/or to signal economic strenght as a modern version of bullionism. Using a unique dataset on daily foreign exchange intervention, this paper investigates the mercantilist motive hypothesis in the case of Brazil. The findings support reserve accumulation as a by-product of successful central bank intervention in the Brazilian foreign exchange market. Results also indicate regional currency intervention spillovers on Brazil's neighbouring countries, opening room for further research.
Part of the literature understands the fivefold increase in global central bank foreign reserves (hereafter called reserves) over the past fifteen years as a by-product of a new mercantilist approach. In a series of papers from the US National Bureau of Economic Research, Dooley et al. (2003 Dooley et al. ( , 2004b Dooley et al. ( ,a,c, 2005a Dooley et al. ( ,c,b, 2007 Dooley et al. ( , 2008 Dooley et al. ( , 2009 ) have described a current 'Revived Bretton Woods' system (BWII) . The BWII would consist of some developing countries using currency intervention, and consequent reserves accumulation, as a methodical way of affecting national currency levels to support export promotion. Aizenman and Lee (2007) , on the other hand, have disputed the so-called BWII framework, minimising the relationship between reserves hoarding and the goal to depreciate (or retard appreciation of) national currencies. Indeed, in accordance to this critique, the main drive for recent reserve build-up would be to prevent or mitigate currency crisis -branded as the insurance motive hypothesis (Durdu et al., 2007; Obstfeld et al., 2010; Jeanne and Ranciere, 2011; Calvo et al., 2012) . This paper investigates the empirical evidence on the mercantilist motive hypothesis, broadly defined as reserve accumulation with the intent to favour export promotion by influencing exchange rates and/or to signal economic strenght as a modern version of bullionism. Using a unique daily dataset on Brazil's foreign exchange intervention, the paper tests the link between reserve accumulation and exchange rate volatility as well as the consequent intervention spillover effects into neighbouring countries.
The paper is organised in two sections. Section 1 explores the link between reserve accumulation and exchange rate volatility in Brazil. Using Brazil's central bank currency intervention data, it deploys a latent factor model to account for the volatility decomposition in the currency market and in the reserve changes of Brazil's major trade partners. The model tests for the efficacy of Brazil's central bank intervention and assesses if Brazil's reserve changes could be used as a good proxy for currency intervention. The results confirm both the efficacy of Brazil's currency intervention and the use of reserve changes as a proxy for intervention. This provides further evidence of the mercantilist motive hypothesis for reserve accumulation. Moreover, results also point to regional spillover effects of Brazil's currency intervention into neighbouring countries.
Section 2 investigates further the regional intervention spillover effects on reserves accumulation as a result of mercantilist motives. A latent factor model explores the 1 empirical evidence of reserve stock co-movements between neighbouring countries due to deliberate central bank intervention on foreign exchange market. In particular, the model investigates the impact of Brazil's central bank intervention on the volatility decomposition of reserve changes in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru. The results confirm the impact of Brazil's central bank intervention, and consequent reserve changes, into the volatility decomposition of the reserve stock movements in neighbouring countries. Moreover, parameter estimates do not support the hypothesis of reserve changes as a result of a modern bullionism practice; leaving co-movements in currency intervention across neighbouring countries to be the driving force behind such regional intervention spillovers.
The link between foreign reserves and exchange rate volatility
This section addresses the empirical relationship between reserves and exchange rate volatility in Brazil. Brazil is an interesting case given its size (the 6th largest economy in the world), importance (leading emerging country, part of the BRIC group) and its claim to hold a floating exchange rate. If evidence is found to support the link between reserves accumulation and currency intervention in an emerging country outside the fixed-exchange-rate realm, the case for the mercantilist motive would be made stronger.
Lately, foreign exchange interventions in emerging markets have gained much attention in the literature, due to the relatively bigger size of their central banks in the domestic economy and a more prominent role of developing nations in the global trade (Menkhoff, 2012) . Yet, monetary authorities in emerging economies usually downplay the use and intent of exchange rate interventions, making it difficult to classify the level of currency floating (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) . In Brazil, for instance, a flexible exchange rate regime has been officially in place since 1999; despite a prevailing de facto unofficial dirty floating management.
Since 2004, Brazil has received vast amounts of foreign currency through trade surpluses, foreign direct investments and international portfolio inflows. The advocates for the mercantilist motive point to the fact that the accompanying large build-up of reserves in the same period has been used to contain the volatility and the appreci- 
Model Specification
A latent factor model with iid and unit variance assumptions is used to capture the co-movements in the volatility of exchange rates and currency intervention, where volatility decompositions are the main vehicle for analysis. In order to investigate the mercantilist motive hypothesis, changes in foreign reserves are also introduced and used as proxy for currency interventions. There are several advantages of using the latent factor framework: it provides a parsimonious representation of the data without the need to identify nor to model observable variables; and, the imposed iid and unit variance assumptions allow for the variance decomposition of the variables in the model, exactly accounting for the contribution of each factor to the overall volatitity. The dynamics of each standardised variable refers to the set of orthogonal latent factors, which comprises: a global factor (ω t ), common to all variables; a currency factor (κ t ), common only to the exchange rate returns; a Brazilian factor (br t ) and
an Argentine factor (ar t ), which respectively capture the combined forces behind the domestic exchange rate returns and reserve changes in each country; and, lastly, a residual factor (u t ) catching the idiosyncracies of each separate market.
The model assumes the dynamics of the intervention days differs from the dynamics of the non-intervention days, which probably prompted the intervention action in the first place. In this regard, to capture this structural break on the parameters, the non-intervention day set is nested in the intervention day set. The notation for the loading factor parameters is λ j i,f , where: j = {0, 1} accounts for the possible structural break according to non-intervention and intervention days; i = {1, 2, ..., 6} corresponds respectively to the standardised variables rEU R j should indirectly impact Argentina's exchange rate market. On the same grounds, but with opposite implications, it is assumed that Brazil's currency interventions have an insignificant impact on the British pound and euro currency markets: Brazil is geographically far from Europe; Brazil's currency is not globally traded; and Brazil plays a relatively small part in world trade, accounting for less than 3% of Europe's external trade.
In matrix form, the model is expressed as
Non-Intervention Days
The use of the model revolves around the volatility decomposition of the standardised variables in Y j t . Using the assumptions that the latent factors in F t are iid (0,1) random variables, the variance of each element in Y 1 t on the intervention days (j = 1) is
As a result, the corresponding proportion of the volatility to each factor is displayed in Table 1 . Table 1 
: Volatility Decomposition on Intervention Days
Notes: Regarding the variance of each element in Y 0 t for the non-intervention days (j = 0), the strutural break parameters (λ 1 i,f , ι br , ι ar ) are dropped.
Factors Global
Currency
Estimation Method
The factor model described in Subsection 1.2 uses a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, which produces consistent, asymptotically normal and efficient estimates (Hansen, 1982) . GMM estimation focuses on the information contained by the moments of the data. The goal is compute the unknown parameters by matching the theoretical moments of the model to the empirical moments of the data in both intervention-day and non-intervention-day sets.
The identification and estimation of the model make use of the precise known days of currency intervention in the Brazilian foreign exchange market. 2 Both Model A and Model B, in this sense, are exactly identified. Each dataset of intervention and non-intervention days provides 21 empirical moments. Thus, 42 empirical moments in total, which are used to identify and estimate the 42 unknown parameters of the model.
Let H j be a T j -by-21 empirical matrix (T j daily observations in each dataset j = {0, 1}, 21 contemporaneous cross-products between the 6 standardised variables in Y j t ), then
It is straightforward to see that, by the law of large numbers, the average value of each column of H j asymptotically converges to the respective true second-order 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. 3 In this case, an optmisation problem is solved by guessing possible parameter values in Λ j of eq.(1) such that minimises the difference between the empirical moments extracted from the columns of H j and the theoretical moments derived from the lower diagonal entries of Λ j Λ j .
Lastly, in order to calculate the standard errors of the estimated parameters, a bootstrap procedure (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994) separetly resamples both datasets (j = {0, 1}) 1000 times. 0.49% on the later (the same lack of domestic forces in Argentina is observed in the nonintervention days with 82.43% and 1.31%, respectively). This leads to the conclusion that the Argentina factor acts mainly as a de facto second residual in the volatility decomposition method -more evidence of Argentina's idiosyncratic markets.
Analysis of the Results
After controlling for global, currency and national factors, the impact of Brazil's central bank intervention data is clear in both Brazil's and Argentina's exchange rate markets. The intervention factor accounts for 6.95% of the overall volatility in Brazil's exchange rate return, sweeping any further residual contribution to this market. Indeed, not only the residual contribution to the Brazilian exchange rate returns is 0.00%, but even its corresponding estimates (λ 0 5,u , λ 1 5,u ) are statistically zero. 5 It is also worth noting that the Brazil's central bank intervention residual factor (u 6,t ) on intervention days had basically the same impact in the overall volatility of both Brazil's central bank intervention data and currency returns -6.44% and 6.95%, respectively. This indicates the full transfer of Brazil's central bank intervention impact into its currency market.
In Argentina, the impact of Brazil's central bank intervention factor was even higher, at 38.83% -a fivefold increase from Brazil's case. This highlights the cross-border effects of Brazil's central bank intervention on the neighbour country and satelite economy.
In this regard, further research would be welcome to better understand the dynamics behind this contagion.
Lastly, Table 3 reports the results on the statistical significance of intervention parameters and joint structural breaks. Both intervention parameters, ι br and ι ar , are individually significant at 10% level. Moreover, further Wald tests on joint parameters also confirm the validity of the model, including the structural break imposed on intervention days. Table 4 ) mimics exacly the same trends and weights of Model A. The global factor predominates in all markets apart from Argentina; the currency factor is stronger in the euro zone; the national factor br t shows strong co-movements behind the Brazilian exchange rate and its reserve changes; the national factor ar t favours the Argentine exchange rate as opposed to its reserve changes, hence acting as a de facto second residual in the volatility decomposition model for the Argentine markets.
The impact of central bank intervention using Brazil's reserve change data is unequivocal. Both intervention parameters ι br and ι ar are statistically significant at 5% (top part of Table 5 ) and very close 7 to the ones estimated in Model A. After controlling for global, currency and national factors, the intervention factor accounts for 6.30%
(little less than the 6.95% estimated in Model A) of the overall volatility in Brazil's 7 The estimated intervention parameters ι br and ι ar in Model B lie inside the 99% confidence interval of the estimated intervention parameters in Model A, and vice-versa. Lastly, Table 5 reports the results on the statistical significance of intervention parameters and joint structural breaks. As noted above, both intervention parameters, ι br and ι ar , are individually significant at 5% level. 8 Moreover, Wald tests on joint parameters also confirm the validity of Model B, including the structural break imposed on intervention days.
Results using other Latin American countries as controls
Limited by data availability on daily reserves, further estimation is carried replacing the The results presented in this subsection are produced with the same estimation methodology in Subsection 1.3, including the same number of standardised variables in Y j t . In Case 1, models A and B are estimated replacing Argentina's currency return (rARc) and reserves change (dARr) variables with the Chilean counterpart (rCHc and dCHr, respectively). In Case 2, models A and B are re-estimated, but now replacing with the Peruvian currency return (rP Ec) and reserves change (dP Er) variables instead.
Case 1: Estimation with Chile's data as Latin America control
Model A: Y j Maintaining the same number of standardised variables in Y j t is crucial for the validity of the results. With 6 standardised variables in Y j t , there is exact identification of the model, with 42 empirical moments to estimate 42 parameters. 10 If the model accommodated the Chilean and Peruvian data and kept the Argentine variables, the sample set would have increased to 10 standardised variables. 11 In this case, 110 empirical moments would be available to estimate 66 parameters: therefore, an overidentification case. In theory, this is not an impediment in itself, but after estimating the augmented model with 10 standardised variables, two problems arose from the overidentification issue. First, the high number of degrees of freedom 12 led to very conflicting and unstable results depending on the initial values of the GMM procedure.
Second, the results failed the overidentification test, implying that the assumption on the ortogonality of the latent factors was not valid. Peru. By attesting the empirical evidence of regional intervention spillover effects on foreign reserves among neighbouring countries, this paper hopes to contribute to a new research agenda on the mercantilist motive for reserve accumulation, which looks into the cross-country links of reserve stocks.
On balance, after controlling for global, regional and domestic factors, results confirm the spillover effects of Brazil's central bank intervention on foreign reserves among neighbouring countries. Yet, parameter estimates do not support the hypothesis of reserve changes as a result of a modern bullionism pratice; leaving co-movements in currency intervention across neighbouring countries to be the driving force behind such regional intervention spillovers.
This section is organised as follows: Subsection 2.1 presents a preliminary analysis of the data; Subsection 2.2 introduces the model specification; Subsection 2.3 describes the estimation method; and Subsection 2.4 examines the results.
Data
This subsection presents a preliminary analysis of the data used to investigate the The dynamics of each standardised variable refers to the set of orthogonal latent factors, which comprises: a global factor (ω t ), common to all variables; a neighbourcountry factor (η t ), to identify countries other than the one where the currency intervention is held; and, lastly, a residual factor (u t ), catching the idiosyncracies of each separate market.
The model assumes the dynamics on intervention days differs from the one on non-intervention days, which probably prompted the intervention action in the first place. In this regard, to capture this structural break on the parameters, the nonintervention day set is nested in the intervention day one. The notation for the loading factor parameters, λ j i,f , follows the rule: j = {0, 1} accounts for the possible structural break according to non-intervention and intervention days; i = {1, 2, ..., 5} corresponds respectively to the standardised variables dARr j pact of Brazil's central bank currency intervention in the reserve changes of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru, respectively.
As a result, the corresponding proportion of the volatility to each factor is displayed in Table 9 . Notes: For the variance of each element in Y 0 t on the non-intervention days (j = 0), the strutural break parameters (λ 1 i,f , ι ar , ι ch , ι pe , ι br ) are dropped.
Factors
Global Neighbour Country Intervention Residual
Estimation Method
As in Subsection 1.3, the factor model described in the eq.(3) uses a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, which produces consistent, asymptotically normal and efficient estimates (Hansen, 1982) . GMM estimation focuses on the information only contained by the moments of the data. The goal is to compute the unknown parameters by matching the theoretical moments of the model to the empirical moments of the data in both intervention-day and non-intervention-day sets.
The identification and estimation of the model make use of the precise known days of currency intervention in the Brazilian foreign exchange market. 14 The model described in eq.(3), in this sense, is exactly identified. Each dataset of intervention and non-intervention days provides 15 empirical moments. Thus, 30 empirical moments in total, which are used to identify and estimate the 30 unknown parameters.
Let H j be a T j -by-15 empirical matrix (T j daily observations in each dataset j, 15 contemporaneous cross-products between the 5 standardised variables in Y j t for j = 0, 1), then
It is straightforward to see that, by the law of large numbers, the average value of each column of H j asymptotically converges, respectively, to the true second-order 2, 3, 4, 5}. 15 In this case, an optmisation problem is solved by guessing possible parameter values in Λ j of eq.(3) such that minimises the difference between the empirical moments extracted from the columns of H j and the theoretical moments derived from the lower diagonal entries of Λ j Λ j .
Lastly, in order to calculate the standard errors of the estimated parameters, a bootstrap procedure (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994) separetly resamples both datasets (j = {0, 1}) 1000 times.
Analysis of the Results
The volatility decomposition of the factor model described in eq.(3) is presented in On the intervention days, a richer dynamics appears. Apart from Chile's volatility, which is mostly due to its residual factor, 17 all other variables seem to share common factors. The global factor accounts for one-fifth to one-fourth of the volatility of the variables -dARr 1 t (18.21%), dP Er 1 t (23.51%), dBRr 1 t (26.37%) and BRint 1 t (24.74%). The neighbour-country factor, on its turn, explains 14.44% and 39.54% of Argentina's and Peru's reserve change volatility, respectively.
Lastly, the impact of Brazil's central bank intervention (the intervention factor), as expected, is clear in Brazil's reserve changes, accounting for 25.97% of its volatility. Additionally, the regional spillover effects of Brazil's central bank intervention on 16 The intervention factor is derived from the impact of the residual factor of Brazil's central bank intervention (u 5,t ) into the reserve stock changes of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru through the respective parameters ι br , ι ar , ι ch and ι pe -see eq.(3).
17 Indeed, the parameter estimates for Chile's global factor (λ 0 2,w , λ 1 2,w ) and neighbour-country factor (λ 0 2,η , λ 1 2,η ) are all statistically insignificant at 10% level, see 
Conclusion
The recent uprise in central bank foreign reserve stocks around the globe has sparked lively debate in the literature. Part of the suggested rationalle for reserve accumulation lies on the mercantilist motive hypothesis, that is, countries would accumulate foreign reserves in order to support export promotion by influencing exchange rates and/or to signal economic strenght as a modern version of bullionism.
Using a unique dataset on daily foreign exchange intervention, this paper investigates the mercantilist motive hypothesis in the case of Brazil. A latent factor model, using a GMM estimation method, is devised to determine the impact of Brazil's central bank currency intervention on the overall volatility of the sample variables.
The paper tackles the issue in two sections. Section 1 explores the link between foreign reserves and exchange rate volatility. In particular, a latent factor model is estimated to decompose the contribution of Brazil's central bank intervention to the overall volatility in the currency market. Accordingly, results support the effectiveness of Brazil's currency intervention during the sample period (May, 2009 to June, 2012 .
Besides, the mercantilist motive hypothesis is also validated: Brazil's reserve changes contitutes a good proxy for currency intervention. Benchmark results show that currency intervention, or reserve changes as a proxy, accounts for 6-7% of the volatility in the Brazilian currency. Lastly, it is noted that Brazil's currency intervention has spillover effects in Argentina and other Latin American countries, which opens room for further research.
Section 2 investigates further the regional spillover effects of reserve accumulation through central bank intervention. Accordingly, a latent factor model looks to the empirical evidence of reserve stock co-movements between neighbouring countries due to deliberate central bank intervention on foreign exchange market. In particular, it investigates the impact of Brazil's central bank intervention on the volatility decomposition of reserve changes in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru. On balance, after controling for global, regional and domestic factors, results confirm the spillover effects of Brazil's central bank intervention on foreign reserves among neighbouring countries.
Yet, parameter estimates do not support the hypothesis of reserve changes as a result of a modern bullionism pratice; leaving co-movements in currency intervention across neighbouring countries to be the driving force behind such regional intervention spillovers.
Overall, this paper contributes to the literature of foreign reserves. First, it provides evidence of mercantilist motives for reserve accumulation in Brazil. During the sample period, Brazil's central bank has successfully intervened in its foreign exchange market, with a sizable by-product reserve build-up. Second, significant regional spillover effects of Brazil's central bank intervention into neighbouring countries are detected, impacting the volatility of the exchange rates and reserve changes in the region. These results invite further research into the cross-country links between reserve accumulations, which might provide additional testimony of foreign reserve mercantilist motives. 
